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CHANGING THE TIDE OF DOUBLE
JEOPARDY IN THE CONTEXT OF
CONTINUING CRIMINAL

ENTERPRISE
Rutledge v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 1241 (1996)
I.

INTRODUCTION

In Rutledge v. United States,' the United States Supreme Court ad-

dressed the issue of whether a court may convict and impose concurrent sentences for continuing criminal enterprise (CCE) 2 and
conspiracy to distribute controlled substances, 3 a predicate offense of
CCE. 4 The Court held that conspiracy is a lesser included offense of
CCE and that convictions for both offenses based upon the same underlying conduct violates the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth
Amendment to the United States Constitution. 5 This decision ended
eighteen years of ambiguity and confusion among the circuits created
after Congress passed the CCE statute in 1970 and the Court published an ambiguous decision, Jeffers v. United States.6 In reaching its
decision, the Court relied upon its historical interpretation of the
Double Jeopardy Clause as prohibiting multiple punishments for the
"same offense." 7 The Court looked to the clear language of the CCE
and conspiracy statutes in determining that, because the conspiracy
statute describes a lesser included offense of CCE, conspiracy is the
"same offense" as CCE.8 Thus, the Court remanded the case for vacation of one the convictions. 9
This Note contends that the Court's failure to address inconsistencies between its reasoning in Rutledge and several of its prior deci1
2
3
4

116 S. Ct. 1241 (1996).
21 U.S.C. § 848 (1994).
21 U.S.C. § 846 (1994).
Rutledge, 116 S. Ct. at 1241.

5 Id. at 1250-51.

6 432 U.S. 137 (1977).
7 Rutedge, 116 S. Ct. at 1245; see U.S. CONST. amend. V, which provides, in pertinent
part, "nor shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice in jeopardy of life or
limb...."
8 Id. at 1247.
9 Id. at 1251.
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sions in similar contexts will lead to confusion far greater than that
resolved by the decision. First, the Court's conclusion that Congress
did not intend to provide multiple punishment when CCE and drug
conspiracy arise from the same act disregarded and is inconsistent
with its analysis of congressional intent in Garrett v. United Statesl °
where it faced a similar issue." Second, the Court's reliance upon the
BlockburgeI' 2 "same-elements test" to conclude that conspiracy is a
lesser included offense of CCE shared improper disregard for the
question of whether the test should apply to compound offenses such
as CCE. Finally, the Court's decision is inconsistent with its pronouncements in an analogous context, the Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations Act' 3 ("RICO"), in which the court has said
that convictions for both RICO and conspiracy do not constitute
14
double jeopardy.
II.
A.

BACKGROUND

HISTORICAL INTERPRETATION OF THE DOUBLE JEOPARDY CLAUSE

The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment provides
that no person shall be "twice put in jeopardy of life or limb" for the
same offense.1 5 The United States Supreme Court has interpreted the
Clause to provide three constitutional safeguards for defendants.' 6
The Clause "protects against a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal. It protects against prosecution for the same offense after conviction. And it protects against multiple punishments
7
for the same offense."'
In determining whether cumulative punishments or successive
prosecutions violate the multiple punishment prong of the double
jeopardy protection, the Court looks at whether two statutes relate to
the "same offense."1 8 The Court has traditionally used the test
promulgated in Blockburger v. United States,'9 sometimes referred to as
10

471 U.S. 773 (1985) (holding that conviction for CCE and narcotics importation, a

predicate offense of CCE, does not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause).
"1 Id.

12 Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932) (stating that two statutes define separate offenses if each requires proof of a fact that the other does not).
13 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68 (1994).
14 See, e.g., United States v. Pungitore, 910 F.2d 1084 (3d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 500 U.S.
915 (1991).
15 U.S. CONST. amend. V; see also Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969) (holding that

the Fifth Amendment's Double Jeopardy Clause applies to states through the Fourteenth
Amendment).
16 North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969).
17 Id. (citations omitted).
18 Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932).
19 Id. United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688, 704 (1993), overruled Grady v. Corbin, 495
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the "same-elements" test, to determine whether two statutes punish
the "same offense." 20 In Blockburger, the Court said that two offenses
are not the same if "each provision requires proof of a fact which the
other does not."2 1 The Court's subsequent decisions expanded the
test to provide that two statutes define the "same offense" if one is a
22
lesser included offense of the other.
More recently, the Court has used the Blockburgertest as a means
of determining congressional intent rather than as a strict rule to determine whether there has been a violation of the Double Jeopardy
Clause. 23 The Court has said that the Double Jeopardy Clause "does

no more than -prevent the sentencing court from prescribing greater
punishment than the legislature intended."24 Thus, offenses are not

the same for double jeopardy purposes if Congress intended cumulative prosecution and sentencing for an offense and its lesser included

offense.2 5 Therefore, even if the Blockburger test suggests that the offenses overlap for double jeopardy purposes, courts may still impose
punishments for each offense if Congress made clear its intention to
authorize such action.2 6 However, in analyzing this issue, courts must
presume that the legislature did not intend to impose two punish27
ments for the same offense absent clear evidence to the contrary.
In addition, the Supreme Court has expanded the notion of what
constitutes "punishment" for purposes of double jeopardy.28 First, the
Court has said that fines should be treated the same as cunmlative
prison sentences. 29 Thus, as the Court stated in Jeffers v. United
States,30 when a defendant is convicted of multiple, overlapping offenses, a fine for each constitutes multiple punishment in violatioi of
U.S. 508 (1990), thus ending a long debate by holding that courts should apply the Blockburger "same elements" test rather than the Grady "same conduct" test in determining
whether two statutes define the same offense.
20 Dixon, 509 U.S. at 696.
21 Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 304.
22 See, e.g., Ball v. United States, 470 U.S. 856, 861-64 (1985) (holding that prosecution
for both "receipt" and "possession" of a firearm is multiple punishment because receipt
necessitates proof of possession); Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 684, 693-94 (1980)
(holding that rape and felony murder predicated on the rape constitute the same offense,
and barred prosecution for both); Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 168 (1977) (stating that
the Blockburgertest leads to the conclusion thatjoyriding is a lesser included offense of auto
theft).
23 Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359 (1983).
24 Id. at 366.
25 See, e.g., id.; Garrett v. United States, 471 U.S. 773, 794-95 (1985).
26 See, e.g., Garrett 471 U.S. at 794-95; Hunter,459 U.S. at 369.
27 See, e.g., Bal, 470 U.S. at 861; Whalen, 445 U.S. at 691-92.
28 See, e.g.,Jeffers v. United States, 432 U.S. 137, 155 (1977); North Carolina v. Pearce,
395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969).
29 Jeffers, 432 U.S. at 155.
30 Id.
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the Double Jeopardy Clause. 3 '
Second, in Ball v. United States,32 the Court said that collateral
33
consequences may constitute impermissible multiple punishment.
The Court's examples of possible collateral consequences included:
delaying the defendant's eligibility for parole, an increased sentence
for a future offense, impeachment in future legal proceedings, and
exacerbated societal stigma.3 4 Even when prison sentences run concurrently, the existence of collateral consequences makes it as impermissible to impose a second conviction as to impose a cumulative
prison sentence.3 5 Therefore, where collateral consequences result, a
prosecutor may seek and try more than one indictment, but a court
36
can only convict and sentence a defendant for one of those counts.
B.

CONTINUING CRIMINAL ENTERPRISE

In 1970, Congress responded to the country's drug problems by
enacting the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control
Act 3 7 This Act shifted the focus of drug enforcement from small time
users to drug peddlers, or "kingpins."3 8 The Act created the crime of
"continuing criminal enterprise" ("CCE"), for which a conviction results in mandatory sentences without parole. 39 Section 848 CCE is a
compound crime. 4 The statute provides
For purposes of subsection (a) of this section, a person is engaged in a
continuing criminal enterprise if-(1) he violates any provision of this
subchapter or subchapter II of this chapter the punishment for which is
a felony and (2) such violation is a part of a continuing series of violations of this subchapter or subchapter II of this chapter-(A) which are
undertaken by such person in concert with five or more other persons
with respect to whom such person occupies a position of organizer, a
(B)
supervisory position, or any other position of management, and
4
from which such person obtains substantial income or resources. '
31 Id.
32 470 U.S. 856 (1985) (holding that the Government could seek an indictment against
defendant for receiving and possessing same weapon, but defendant could not suffer two
convictions or sentences on that indictment).
33 Id. at 865.
34 Id.
35 Id.
36 Id.
37 21 U.S.C. §§ 801-966 (1994).
38 See Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, H.R. REP. No.
91-1444 (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4566, 4570; see also Garrett v. United States,
471 U.S. 773, 781 (1985); Susan W. Brenner, S. C.A.RF.A.C.E.: A Speculation on DoubleJeopardy and Compound CriminalLiability, 27 NEw ENG. L. REv. 915, 935-36 (1993).
39 21 U.S.C. § 848 (1994).
40 See id. A "compound crime" is one in which two or more criminal elements must
exist in order for the crime to exist. BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 286 (6th ed. 1990).
41 21 U.S.C. § 848(c).
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That is, the government must show that the defendant committed a
series of narcotic violations, or "predicate offenses," while organizing
or supervising at least five other people and deriving substantial in42
come from the operation.
C.

IMPLICATIONS OF DOUBLE JEOPARDY IN CCE CONTEXT

Although the CCE offense had been the subject of extensive constitutional scrutiny since its inception in 1970 and amendments in
1984, 43 The Supreme Court did not answer the constitutional question of whether convictions for CCE and any of its predicate offenses
based upon the same series of actions violate the Double Jeopardy
Clause until 1996.44 Before Rutledge, the Supreme Court had dealt
with this issue only two times and had not heard a CCE case since
1985.5 In the interim, several lines of decisions developed among
federal circuit courts as to whether the courts can enter convictions
and sentences for both CCE and its predicate offense of narcotics conspiracy where a jury returns verdicts of guilty for both charges. 46
1.

Supreme Court Decisions

a. Jeffers v. United States47
Jeffers v. United States was the first case in which the Supreme
Court addressed CCE. In Jeffers, a grand jury returned two indictments against Jeffers. 48 The first charged him with § 846 narcotics
conspiracy and § 841 substantive distribution, which are both predicate offenses to CCE. 49 The second indictment charged him with operating a CCE.50 The Government moved to join the indictments
under one trial stating that the offensive acts involved a common
plan. 5 ' The court denied this motion. 52 Then the Government made
the seemingly contradictory claim, in response to a double jeopardy
42 See

id.

43 See Phillip H. Cherney, Thrice injeopardy: The CCE ProsecutionofFelix Mitchell

27 SANTA
L. REv. 515, 516 (1987) (discussing the Court's fleshing out of issues relating to
vagueness and cruel and unusual punishment).
44 Id.
45 See Garrett v. United States, 471 U.S. 773 (1985);Jeffers v. United States, 432 U.S. 137
(1977).
46 See infra Part ll.C.2.
47 432 U.S. 137 (1977).
CLARA

48 Id. at 140.
49 Id. Section

848 requires, among other things, that the defendant acted "in concert
with five or more other persons," while § 846 requires agreement among the defendant
and one or more other parties. See 21 U.S.C. § 848(c).
50 Jeffers, 432 U.S. at 141.
51 Id. at 142.
52 Id.
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argument in Jeffers motion to dismiss, that the § 846 conspiracy and
§ 848 CCE were wholly separate offenses.5 3 The trial court denied the
motion to dismiss, implicitly accepting the argument that neither the
parties nor the charges for each offense were the same. 4
After conviction for conspiracy in the first trial, Jeffers moved to
dismiss the CCE case against him. 55 Contrary to his argument against
the Government's joinder motion, Jeffers said that CCE and conspiracy were the same offense, so prosecution for CCE after his conviction
for conspiracy violated the Double Jeopardy Clause. 5 6 The trial court
rejected the motion, and the Seventh Circuit affirmed.5 7 Jeffers ap58
pealed to the Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court refused to consider whether the Government's use of a single series of actions to prove both § 846 conspiracy
and § 848 CCE violated the Double Jeopardy Clause.5 9 Instead, a plurality held that by electing to have the offenses tried in separate proceedings, the defendant waived any right he may have had to object to
the subsequent prosecution for CCE. 60 Justice White concurred with
the judgment based upon his conclusion that conspiracy is not a lesser
included offense of CCE. 6 1 Thus, the Court allowed both of Jeffers'
62
convictions to stand.
Although the Court did not squarely decide the constitutionality
of convictions for both conspiracy and CCE, the opinion strongly suggested that, absent extentuating circumstances such as those in Jeffers,
this would violate the Fifth Amendment. 6 First, although the Court's
holding rendered it unnecessary for the plurality to examine the
lesser included offense issue, the Court assumed that conspiracy was a
lesser included offense of CCE "for purposes of argument."64 The
plurality rejected the Government's argument that the "in concert"
language in § 848 required something different than the element of
"agreement" required by § 846 for a conviction of narcotics conspiracy.65 Thus, the Court concluded that § 846 conspiracy is a lesser inId. at 144.
H
55 Id.
53

54

56 Id.
57

SeeJeffers v. United States, 532 F.2d 1101 (7th Cir. 1976).

58 Jeffers, 432 U.S. 137.
59 Id. at 152.
60 Id.
61
62

Id. at 158 (White, J., concurring in the judgment in part).

63

Id. at 149-57.

Id.

64 Id. at 149-50.
65 Id. at 148-49.
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cluded offense of § 848 CCE.6
Finally, after concluding that the government had the right to
prosecute the defendant for both offenses, the plurality examined
whether the court could permissibly impose cumulative punishment
in the form of separate fines.6 7 The Court said that even though the
Government had the right to try the defendant for both offenses, Congress did not intend for courts to impose multiple penalties. 68 Thus,
the Court remanded the case to reduce the total of the defendant's
two fines from $125,000 to $100,000, the maximum amount allowable
under § 848.69
b.

Garrett v. United States7"

Examining a similar issue, the Court in Garrettv. United States held
that a conviction for CCE and narcotics importation, a substantive
predicate offense 71 of CCE, did not violate the Double Jeopardy
72
Clause.
Garrett organized and directed an enterprise that imported and
distributed marijuana.7 3 He pled guilty to a charge for importing, and
ajury sentenced him to five years in prison and a $15,000 fine. 74 Two
months later and in a different district, the Government charged him
with CCE. 75 Based upon evidence of importation used to prove the
previous charge, the jury found Garrett guilty. 76 The court sentenced
Garrett to forty years imprisonment to be served consecutively with his
78
earlier sentence. 77 The Eleventh Circuit affirmed.
On appeal to the Supreme Court, the defendant claimed that his
conviction for CCE violated double jeopardy because facts from his
66 Id. at 150-51. The Court went on to say that although Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161
(1977), prohibits prosecution for a greater offense and its lesser included offense, as this

would be prosecution for the "same offense" in violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause,
the defendant triggered an exception to Brown by electing to have the offenses tried in
separate proceedings.
67 Jeffers, 482 U.S. at 155-57.
68 Id. at 157.
69 Id. at 157-58.
70 471 U.S. 773 (1985).
71 Courts often distinguish between a "substantive" predicate offense, that is one which
is complete in itself and not dependent upon another, and a predicate offense of "conspiracy" which depends upon the existence of another "target crime" contemplated by the
conspiracy.
72 Garrett, 471 U.S. at 793.
73 Id. at 775.
74 Id.

75 Id. at 776.
76 Id. at 776-77.
77 Id.

78 Garrett v. United States, 727 F. 2d 1003 (11th Cir. 1984).
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prior conviction for drug importation were used to prove necessary
elements of CCE.79 The defendant said that since his prior conviction
was for a lesser included offense of CCE, the conviction implicated
both the multiple punishment and the successive punishment prongs
80
of double jeopardy.
In an opinion written by Justice Rehnquist,8 1 the Court held that
because Congress intended to allow cumulative sentences for CCE
and conspiracy, the convictions did not violate double jeopardy.8 2 Justice Rehnquist said that the language, structure and legislative history
of the Controlled Substances Act indicate that Congress intended
CCE to be a distinct offense punishable in addition to, not as an alternative for, predicate offenses.8 3 The Court assumed that, absent evidence to the contrary, in creating CCE and its predicate offenses,
4
Congress intended to authorize cumulative punishment.8
The Court briefly distinguished this case from Jeffers.85 Justice
Rehnquist said that in the case of conspiracy and CCE, the dangers to
be protected against are sufficiently similar, and thus cumulative punishment is unnecessary.8 6 The Court stated that convictions for CCE
and a substantive predicate offense such as drug importation, are distinguishable, so that the Court in Garrettfaced a distinct issue not ad87
dressed in Jeffers.
2. Split in the Circuits
The federal circuit courts utilized differing interpretations of the
Supreme Court's pronouncements on double jeopardy in the context
of CCE and conspiracy.88 The approaches differed in whether they
allowed convictions and sentences for each offense. The ambiguity of
Jeffers and the lack of a consistent standard left the multiple punish79 Garrett v. United States, 471 U.S. 773, 777-78 (1985).
80 Id.
81 Justice Rehnquist was joined by ChiefJustice Burger andJustices Blackmun, White,

and O'Connor.
82 Garrett,471 U.S. at 793.
83 Id. at 778-86.
84 Id. at 793.
85 Id. at 794.
86 Id.

87 Id. at 794-95.
88 See United States v. Rutledge, 40 F.3d 879, 886 (7th Cir. 1994) (holding that a court
may enter convictions for both CCE and conspiracy); United States v. Medina, 940 F.2d
1247 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding that a court can only enter judgment for either CCE or
conspiracy, but if one of the convictions is overturned on appeal, the other may be reinstated); United States v. Aiello 771 F.2d 621, 632-35 (2d Cir. 1985) (holding that findings
of guilt for CCE and conspiracy must be combined and entered as a single conviction);
United States v. Smith, 703 F.2d 627 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (per curiam) (holding that courts
may enter only one judgment on convictions for CCE and conspiracy).
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ment prong of double jeopardy in "disarray."8 9
A majority of the circuits have held that courts may enter only
one judgment when ajury finds a defendant guilty of both conspiracy
and CCE.9 0 Most of these courts interpretedJeffers to prohibit convictions and sentences for both offenses. 9 1 These courts believed that
Jeffers concluded that conspiracy is a lesser-included offense of CCE, so

punishments for both, would violate double jeopardy.

2

Some of the

majority courts cited the Court's decision in Ball v. United States9 3 as

support for the conclusion that CCE and conspiracy convictions violate double jeopardy's prohibition against multiple punishment be94
cause of the adverse collateral consequences of a second conviction.
The Second and Third Circuits adopted an intermediate position.95 In those circuits, when ajury returns verdicts of guilty for CCE
and conspiracy charges based on the underlying conduct, the courts

"combined" the two convictions into a single count.96 The punishment for this count could not exceed that maximum allowable for the
97
greater offense.

The Ninth Circuit took a position similar to the Second and
Third Circuits. 98 Although it did not specifically address a conviction
for CCE and § 846 conspiracy, the Ninth Circuit adopted a general
approach for cases in which the court may charge and try a defendant
for two offenses but may enter only one conviction. 99 In such cases,
the court stayed the sentence and entry ofjudgment of conviction on
all but one count. 10 0 Then, the Circuit authorized the district court to
89 Fernandez v. United States, 500 U.S. 948 (1991) (White, J., dissenting from denial of
certiorari).
90 See, e.g., United States v.Jones, 918 F.2d 909 (11th Cir. 1990) (per curiam); United
States v. Rivera, 900 F.2d 1462 (10th Cir. 1990); United States v. Butler, 885 F.2d 195 (4th
Cir. 1989); Smith, 703 F.2d at 627; United States v. Michel, 588 F.2d 986 (5th Cir. 1979).
91 See Jones, 918 F.2d at 909; Rivera, 900 F.2d at 1462; Smith, 703 F.2d at 627; Butler,885
F.2d at 195; Miche4 588 F.2d at 986.
92 Jones, 918 F.2d at 909; Rivera, 900 F.2d at 1462; Smith, 703 F.2d at 627; Butler,885 F.2d
at 195; Mihe, 588 F.2d at 986.
93 470 U.S. 856 (1985).
94 United States v. Montanye, 962 F.2d 1332, 1346-47 (8th Cir. 1992); United States v.
David, 940 F.2d 722, 738-39 (1st Cir. 1991); United States v. Schuster, 769 F.2d 337, 343-45
(6th Cir. 1985).
95 See, e.g., United States v. Fernandez, 916 F.2d 125, 128-29 (3d Cir. 1990); United
States v. Aiello 771 F.2d 621, 632-35 (2d Cir. 1985).
96 See Fernandez, 916 F.2d at 128-29; Aie//o, 771 F.2d at 632-35.
97 See Fernandez, 916 F.2d at 128-29; Aiello, 771 F.2d at 632-35.
98 SeeUnited States v. Medina, 940 F.2d 1247, 1252-53 (9th Cir. 1991); United States v.
Palafox, 764 F.2d 558, 564 (9th Cir. 1985).
99 See Medina, 940 F.2d at 1252-53; Palafox, 764 F.2d at 564.
100 Cf United States v. Hernandez-Escarsega, 886 F.2d 1560, 1582 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that conviction on drug conspiracy offense must be vacated in light of CCE conviction,
but not stating whether drug conspiracy conviction could be reinstated if CCE conviction
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enter ajudgment of conviction and sentence on the remaining count
or counts if a court ultimately reverses the entered conviction.101
The Seventh Circuit's position on this issue was at odds with all of
the other circuits. 10 2 The Seventh Circuit held that double jeopardy
allowed separate convictions for CCE and conspiracy, as long as the
cumulative sentence did not exceed the maximum allowable under
the CCE statute.' 0 3 Like the other circuits, the Seventh Circuit cited
Jeffers as support for this conclusion. 10 4 The court interpreted the Jeffers Court's upholding of concurrent sentences as condoning separate
sentences.' 05 Also, in United States v. Bond,10 6 the Seventh Circuit rejected the Ball Court's approach to collateral consequences of multiple convictions.' 0 7 The Bond court stated that the unavailability of
parole for the CCE conviction negates the concern that multiple con108
victions will hurt the defendant at parole time.
III.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Tommy Rutledge organized and supervised a cocaine distribution enterprise from November 1986 until his arrest by federal agents
in December 1990.109 Rutledge began the enterprise by personally
making biweekly deliveries of cocaine to Roger Malott in Astoria, Illinois. 110 Rutledge initially purchased the cocaine fromJuan Gonzalez,
an acquaintance from prison and a member of Chicago's Latin Kings
street gang."'
Rutledge's operations continued when he moved from Chicago
to Youngstown, Illinois.' 1 2 In Youngstown, Rutledge relied upon Roberto Laurel, another member of the Latin Kings, to provide weapons
and drugs. 113 Around this time, Rutledge recruited Malott and at
least seven others to join his enterprise. 1 4 These employees delivwas overturned).
101 See, e.g., id.
102 See, e.g., United States v. Rutledge, 40 F.3d 879, 886 (7th Cir. 1994); United States v.

Bafia, 949 F.2d 1465, 1473 (7th Cir. 1991); United States v. Bond, 847 F.2d 1233, 1238-39
(7th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 270 (1996).
10- See, e.g., Rutledge, 40 F.3d at 886; Bafia, 949 F.2d at 1473; Bond, 847 F.2d at 1238-39.
104 See, e.g., Rutledge, 40 F.3d at 886; Bafia, 949 F.2d at 1473; Bond, 847 F.2d at 1238-39.
105 Bond, 847 F.2d at 1238-39.
106 Id.
107 Id. at 1239.
108 Id.
109 Rutledge, 40 F.3d at 882-83.
110 Id. at 882.
1I Id.
112 Id.
113 Id.
114 Id.
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ered cocaine and collected debts for Rutledge's drug sales.' 1 5 To
a cache of firemaintain control over his operation, Rutledge secured
6
cocaine."
for
traded
and
bought
arms which he
From November 1988 until his arrest inJuly 1989, Rutledge based
his operations in a trailer in Youngstown that he shared with three of
his underlings." 7 In July 1989, the Illinois State Police searched the
trailer based upon statements made by Malott. 118 Upon finding weapons, but no drugs, the police arrested Rutledge." 9 When Rutledge
discovered that Malott had made incriminating statements to the police, Rutledge threatened Malott and another employee with serious
harm if either testified against him in court. 120 Consequently, both
testified before a state grand jury that Rutledge had no involvement
2
with drugs or guns, forcing the state to release Rutledge.' '
After his release, Rutledge continued his drug operations until
federal authorities arrested him in December 1990.122 The United
States District Court for the Central District of Illinois charged Rutledge with six offenses related to his dealings in drugs and firearms:
operating a continuing criminal enterprise in violation of 21 U.S.C.
§ 848, conspiring to distribute cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846,
distributing cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841 (a) (1), possessing a
firearm after being convicted of a felony in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 9 22 (g), and two counts of using or carrying a firearm during and in
relation to a drug trafficking offense in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(c).123

After a nine-day trial in which several of Rutledge's employees
testified against him, a jury found Rutledge guilty on each of the six
counts. 12 4 The court sentenced Rutledge to three terms of life imprisonment without parole for the CCE offense, the drug conspiracy offense, and the substantive cocaine distribution offense. 125 The court
also sentenced Rutledge to a sentence of ten years imprisonment for
possession of a firearm as a convicted felon, five years imprisonment
for carrying a firearm in relation to drug trafficking, and an additional
115 Id. The employees included Shelly Henson, Richard Hagemaster, Rick Bolen, Randy
Mustread, Kim Mummert, Tom Crowe, and Stan Winters. Id.
116 Id.
17 Id.
118 Id.
119 Id. at 882-83.
120 Id. at 883.
121 Id.
122 Id.
123 Brief for the United States at 2, Rutledge v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 1241 (1996)
(No. 94-8769).
124 Rutledge v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 1241, 1244 (1996).
125 Brief for the United States at 3, Rutkdge (No. 94-8769).
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ten-year sentence for the similar sixth count. 126 Rutledge was to serve
all six of these prison sentences concurrently. 27 Finally, pursuant to
18 U.S.C. § 3013, the court imposed a fifty-dollar special assessment
on each count for a total of $300.128
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit affirmed.' 29 In a pro se supplemental brief, Rutledge argued that the conviction and sentence on
both the CCE and conspiracy charge violated the Double Jeopardy
Clause of the Fifth Amendment by punishing him twice for the same
offense.' 3 0 Although it agreed with the premise that the conspiracy
charge was a lesser included offense of the CCE charge, the Seventh
Circuit stated that the trial court did not violate Rutledge's Fifth
Amendment rights.' 3' Relying upon its decision in United States v.
Bond,' 32 and the Supreme Court decision in Jeffers v. United States,' 33
the court held that concurrent sentences for CCE and conspiracy are
permissible when the cumulative punishment does not exceed the
34
maximum sentence allowable under the CCE statute.
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari' 35 to determine whether the convictions for CCE and conspiracy violated the
Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States
13 6
Constitution.
IV.

SUMMARY OF OPINION

The United States Supreme Court reversed the Seventh Circuit in
a unanimous opinion written by Justice Stevens.' 37 Justice Stevens
agreed that conspiracy is a lesser included offense of CCE.' 38 However, contrary to the Seventh Circuit, Justice Stevens asserted that
126 Id.
127 Id.
128 Id.

129 United States v. Rutledge, 40 F.3d 879 (7th Cir. 1994). This appeal also affirmed
Shelly Henson's and Richard Hagemaster's convictions for conspiring to distribute cocaine
in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846.
130 Id. at 886. Other issues raised on appeal and dismissed as meritless included: Rutledge's contention that the court denied him a fair trial because several jurors saw him in
handcuffs outside the courtroom; his contention that testimony regarding his connection
with the Latin Kings was irrelevant and prejudicial and thus the court should have excluded it; and his contention that because one witness did not did not testify at trial, the
court should have omitted the witness' statements from the presentence report.
131 Id.

132 847 F.2d 1233, 1238 (7th Cir. 1988).

133 432 U.S. 137, 155-57 (1977).
134 Rutledge, 40 F.3d at 886.
'35 Rutledge v. United States, 115 S. Ct. 2608 (1995).
136 Rutledge v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 1241 (1996).
'37 Id. at 1244.
138 Id. at 1250.
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Congress intended to authorize only one punishment for the act of
conspiring. 3 9 Consequently, one of Rutledge's convictions and the
concurrent sentence constituted impermissible punishment for the
same offense and required vacation. 4°
Justice Stevens began by stating the general rule that courts may
not "prescrib[e] greater punishment than the legislature intended."' 4 1 Where two statutory provisions address the "same offense," a court must presume that a legislature did not intend to
impose two punishments for that offense.14 2 According to justice Stevens, the Court determines whether two statutes describe the "same
offense" by applying the test promulgated in Blockburger v. United
States,14 3 which looked at "'whether each provision requires proof of a
fact which the other does not.' ' 144 Furthermore, Justice Stevens
pointed out that two different statutes define the "same offense" when
one offense is a lesser included offense of the other. 45
The Court then applied the Blockburgerrule to Rutledge and determined that CCE clearly requires proof of additional elements beyond
those of conspiracy.' 46 However, according to Justice Stevens, the
tougher question under Blockburger was whether conspiracy required
proof of any element not included in the CCE offense.' 47
In examining this issue, the Court noted that Jeffers' 48 explicitly
rejected the proposition that the "in concert" element of CCE may be
satisfied by something less than "an actual agreement among the parties" required in a prosecution for conspiracy.149 The Court also
pointed out that appellate courts have consistently held that conspiracy is a lesser included offense of CCE.'3 0 For these reasons, the
Court held that conspiracy is not distinguishable from CCE and char151
acterized conspiracy as a lesser included offense of CCE.
Next, Justice Stevens rejected the Government's argument that
even if conspiracy is a lesser included offense of CCE, the second con'39 Id.
140 Id. at 1250-51.
141 Id. at 1245 (quoting Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 366 (1983)) (internal quotations omitted).
142 Id. (citing Ball v. United States, 470 U.S. 856, 861 (1985); Whalen v. United States,
445 U.S. 684, 691-92 (1980)).
143 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932).
144 RutLedge, 116 S. Ct. at 1245 (quoting Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 304).
145 Id.
146 Id.
147 Id.
148 432 U.S. 137 (1977).
149 Rutklge, 116 S.Ct. at 1246 (citingJeffers v. United States, 432 U.S. 137 (1977)).

150 Id. at 1247.
151 Id.
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viction does not constitute a punishment when the defendant serves
the two sentences concurrently.1 52 According to Justice Stevens, the
fifty-dollar assessment for the second conviction will always constitute
a second punishment.1 5 3 Furthermore, regardless of the fifty-dollar
assessment, he determined that the Court's decision in Ball v. United
States'5 4 limited the Government's argument. 15 5 Justice Stevens said
that even where a second sentence is served concurrently, the collateral consequences of the second conviction and sentence make it just
as impermissible as a cumulative sentence.' 56 The Court determined
that, at the very least, the fifty-dollar assessment constituted an imper157
missible collateral consequence.
Justice Stevens also disagreed that the Government could overcome the general presumption against allowing multiple punishments
because Congress intended to allow courts to impose them in the case
of CCE and conspiracy.' 58 First, Justice Stevens criticized the Government's use of Jeffers' 5 9 to support this argument. 60 He said that the
Court's decision to uphold convictions for conspiracy and CCE in Jeffers did not control the present case and, furthermore, had no relation
to congressional intent.16 ' Justice Stevens noted that the plurality upheld the convictions there because the petitioner waived his right to
object to the second conviction, while the concurrence maintained
that the two convictions were not for the "same offense." 162 Justice
Stevens would not infer a suggestion by the plurality inJeffers that Congress intended to allow dual convictions.I 63
In response to the Government's final argument, Justice Stevens
said that the Court had already developed rules to avoid the need to
provide a "back up" conviction in case a defendant successfully appealed the greater offense.' 64 Most federal appellate courts have concluded that a court may enter ajudgment for a lesser included offense
when a court reverses a conviction for the greater offense on grounds
that only affect the greater offense. 65 Because neither legislatures
152
153
154
155
156
157
158

IM at 1247-48.
Id. at 1247.
470 U.S. 856 (1985). See supra notes 32-36 and accompanying text.
Rutledg 116 S. Ct. at 1248.
IL

Id
H

159 432 U.S. 137, 152-54 (1977) (allowing convictions for both conspiracy and CCE).
160 Rutledge v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 1241, 1248 (1996).
161 Id at 1248-49.
162 Id.
163 Id.
164 Id
165 Id at 1250.
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nor courts feel it necessaxy to impose multiple convictions, Justice Stevens rejected the Government's argument that Congress intended to
do so in creating the CCE and conspiracy statutes.' 66
Justice Stevens concluded that narcotics conspiracy constitutes a
lesser included offense of CCE and that Congress did not intend to
67
authorize more than one punishment for a single act of conspiring.'
Therefore, multiple convictions and sentences for CCE and conspiracy violate the Double Jeopardy Clause. 168 Accordingly, the Court remanded the case with instructions to vacate one of Rutledge's
69
convictions and sentences.'

V.

ANALYSIS

While the Supreme Court definitively resolved the issue of
whether convictions and sentences for CCE and conspiracy constitute
double jeopardy, the Court's reasoning was troubling for several reasons. In Part A below, this Note argues that the Court inappropriately
disregarded Garrett,'70 the applicable precedent in Rutledge.'71 Part B
contends that the Court applied the wrong test in determining
whether CCE and conspiracy constitute the "same offense" for purposes of double jeopardy. Part C argues that the Court should have
based its decision upon reasoning used in the analogous context of
RICO and conspiracy. Finally, Part D offers as a possible explanation
for the Court's inappropriate decision in Rutledge its conservative adherence to the letter of the law.
A.

THE COURT SHOULD HAVE APPLIED THE GARRE7T REASONING

TO

RUTLEDGE

1. Because There is no Legitimate Distinction Between Garrett and
Jeffers, Garrett is the ControllingPrecedent in Cases of
Convictionsfor CCE and Conspiracy such as
Rutledge
The Court should have applied the Garrettreasoning to this case.
In both Garrett and Jeffers, the Court addressed the issue of whether
conviction for CCE and one of its lesser offenses constitutes double
jeopardy. 7 2 Because the Garrett decision conflicted with the Jeffers
166 Id.
167 Id.

168 Id
169 Id. at 1250-51.

170 Garrett v. United States, 471 U.S. 773 (1985).
171 Rutledge v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 1241 (1996).
172 Garrett addressed CCE and narcotics importation;effers addressed CCE and narcotics
conspiracy.
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plurality and the distinction between the two cases is attenuated at
best, the Court should have acknowledged Garrettas a reevaluation of
the CCE statute and applied its reasoning to Rutledge. In doing so, the
Court would have found that Congress intended cumulative punishment for drug conspiracy and CCE.
The Court in Garrettmade an unconvincing distinction between
the issue there and the issue inJeffers.173 The Court said that theJeffers
Court based its decision upon a belief that the dangers against which
conspiracy and CCE statutes protect are so similar that there is no
sense in cumulating penalties. 174 By contrast, the dangers protected
against by the two crimes in Garrett, drug importation and CCE, are
not so similar as to warrant this same conclusion. 175 Actually, only the
fourjustice plurality inJeffers believed that the dangers were similar.176
More accurately, the Jeffers Court based its holding on its belief that
CCE already prohibit conspiracy, and this reasoning applies to any of
CCE's predicate offenses. 1 77 Thus, because the Jeffers Court decided
that convictions for CCE and any one of its predicate offenses constitute double jeopardy, and no legitimate distinction between Garrett
and Jeffers exists, Garrett effectively overruled Jeffers. Accordingly, at
least one circuit has rejected the conclusion that § 848 CCE and § 846
78
conspiracy protect against similar dangers.'
One could argue that the underlying facts supporting CCE and a
substantive predicate offense versus CCE and the narcotics conspiracy
179
offense justify the Court's distinction between Garrett and Jeffers.
For example, a defendant could violate the importation statute, sell
the drugs to one other person, and be involved in CCE based upon an
entirely different source of narcotics. On the other hand, if a defendant is working in agreement with at least five others for purposes of
§ 846 conspiracy, he will necessarily be working "in concert" with
them for purposes of § 848 CCE, an argument accepted by the Court
in Rutledge.18 0 Thus, although convictions for CCE and conspiracy will
always be punishment for the same conduct, punishment for CCE and
17- See Garret, 471 U.S. at 794-95.
174

Id.

175 Id.
176 Jeffers v. United States, 432 U.S. 137, 148-50 (1977). Justice White concurred in the

judgment in part and stated that he did not believe that conspiracy is a lesser included
offense of CCE. Id. at 158 (White, J., concurring in the judgement in part and dissenting

in part). Also, the dissenters explicitly rejected the notion that CCE and conspiracy are so
similar as to prohibit convictions for both. Id. at 159 (Stevens,J., concurring in the judgement in part and dissenting in part).
177 See id. at 148-50.
178 See United States v. Fernandez, 822 F.2d 382, 384 (3d Cir. 1987).
179 See Garret4 471 U.S. at 794-95.
180 See Rutledge v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 1241, 1246 (1996).
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one of its substantive predicates could be punishment for two separate
and unrelated acts. In this context, multiple convictions for the latter
are distinct and do not constitute double jeopardy.
However, this distinction is irrelevant if Congress intended to
punish a defendant for both CCE and each of its underlying offenses.1 8 1 If the CCE and conspiracy statutes protect against distinct
dangers in the same way CCE and its substantive predicate offense
statutes do, Garrett'sdistinction from Jeffers fails, and Garrettis the appropriate precedent for cases regarding CCE and each of its predicate
offenses. Though not explicitly overruling Jeffers, the Garrettdecision
created a new means of analysis for CCE and each of its predicate
offenses. The Court should have applied this more recent analysis to
Rutledge.
2. If the Court Had Applied Garrett to Rutledge, It Would Have Come
to the Conclusion that the Convictionsfor CCE and Conspiracy
Did Not ConstituteDoubleJeopardy
The GarrettCourt's analysis suggested that the Court should reject double jeopardy claims in subsequent examinations of convictions
82
for CCE and all of its underlying offenses, including conspiracy.'
The Court inappropriately failed to follow this direction in Rutledge.
First, the Court's conclusion in Garrettthat the language of § 848 creates a distinct offense, punishable separately from other offenses, applies to conspiracy in the same way it applies to substantive predicate
offenses. Conspiracy is prohibited by a statute distinct from the CCE
statute just as the other predicate offenses are prohibited by their own
separate statutes.' 8 3 The Court noted that the language of CCE "affirmatively states an offense for which punishment will be imposed."184 The Court emphasized the distinction between a statute
that imposes its own penalty and a "recidivist" statute that simply enhances the penalty imposed for other violations. 185 Because CCE provides its own penalty, and a separate section of the Controlled
Substances Act 18 6 provides the recidivist provision, CCE is a distinct
offense.' 87 This reasoning provides support for the proposition that
CCE is distinct from each of its predicate offenses, including conspir181 See, e.g., Garrett 471 U.S. at 794-95; Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 369 (1983); see

also infra notes 188-95 and accompanying text.
182 See 471 U.S. at 773.
183 See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 846 (1994) (prohibiting narcotics conspiracy); 21 U.S.C. § 921
(1994) (prohibiting narcotics importation).
184 Garrett 471 U.S. at 779.
185 IRL at 781.
186 21 U.S.C. § 849 (1994).
187 Garrett, 471 U.S. at 779.
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acy, and therefore punishable in addition to its underlying offenses.
The Garrett Court's analysis of legislative intent applies to conspiracy as well as substantive predicate offenses.188 The Court's analysis
concluded that Congress created CCE as an offense separate from its
predicates. 189 The Court looked to congressional debate over whether
CCE should be a recidivist provision or a new, distinct offense.' 9 0 The
CCE statute was introduced in the House as a recidivist provision, but
the House Committee substituted that provision with the current CCE
statute.' 9 ' Representative Poff described the statute as embodying "'a
new separate criminal offense with a separate criminal penalty.'"192
In addition, the Garrett Court concluded that the legislative history gave no indication that Congress intended to substitute the predicate offenses with a conviction under CCE.193 According to the Garrett
Court, specifying that a defendant should be convicted and punished
for both offenses would have been stating the obvious, as the entire
debate suggests that Congress intended to create a new enforcement
tool, not substitute existing tools. 1 94 For instance, Representative
Weicker said, "'This bill goes further in providing those persons
charged with enforcing it a wide variety of enforcement tools which
will enable them to more effectively combat the illicit drug trafficker
and meet the increased demands we have imposed on them.'"195
Although some still argue that legislative history is inconclusive as
to whether Congress intended to punish defendants under both CCE
and conspiracy statutes, 19 6 the Garrett Court squarely rejected this notion.197 The Court pointed out that precedent requires that Congress
"clearly" and "specifically" authorize multiple punishment. 198 Faced
with this requirement, the Garrett Court still found the legislative history conclusive, implying that the history was sufficiently "clear and
specific." 19 9
188 Id.

189 Id- (citing H.R. REP. No. 91-1444, reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.CA.N. 4566, 4651).
190

Id- at 782-84.

191 Id. at 782-83.
192 Id. at 783 (quoting H.RL REP. No. 91-1444); see also 116 CONG. REc. 33302 (1970)

(remarks of Rep. Eckhardt).
193 Garrett, 471 U.S. at 782-85.
194 Id. at 784.
195 Id. at 785 (quoting 116 CONG. Rac. 33630-33631 (1970)).
196 See, e.g., Kenneth G. Schuler, Continuing CriminalEnterprise, Conspiracy, and the Multi-

ple PunishmentDoctrine, 91 MICH. L.Ra,. 2220, 2246 (1993).
197 Garrett, 471 U.S. at 784-85.
198 Id.; Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 368 (1983); Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S.

684, 692-93 (1980); see alsoAlbernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333, 340 (1981) (stating that
the Blockburgerrule is controlling absent "a clear indication of contrary legislative intent").
199 Garret4 471 U.S. at 785.
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Therefore, as the controlling precedent, the Garrett analysis of
congressional intent applies to conspiracy just as it applies to substantive predicate offenses, and the Court should have applied it as such
in Rutledge. Instead, the Rutledge Court failed to squarely address the
issue of legislative history and only rejected the Government's position
that Congress intended to allow courts to convict defendants for both
CCE and conspiracy.20 0 The Court therefore failed to give congressional intent the weight it traditionally has been given in issues of
double jeopardy. Had the Court accounted for congressional intent
and applied the Garrett analysis, it would have determined that Congress intended separate and cumulative punishment for CCE and conspiracy. Accordingly, it should have determined that conviction and
sentencing for both does not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause.
B.

THE COURT SHOULD HAVE ADDRESSED THE POSSIBLE
INAPPLICABILITY OF THE BLOCKBURGER ANALYSIS

The Court inappropriately applied the Blockburge 20 1 analysis to
this case. The Court disregarded the ongoing debate over whether the
Blockburgertest should apply to the double jeopardy analysis in cases of
compound offenses like CCE or whether, more appropriately, courts
should simply look to congressional intent.20 2 Justice Stevens utilized
the Blockburgertest as the primary means of determining whether conspiracy is a lesser included offense of CCE, and therefore concluded
that conviction for both violates the Double Jeopardy Clause.20 3 The
Rutledge Court should have acknowledged the conflicting approaches
and seized the opportunity to definitively settle the matter.
The first indication that the Blockburger same-element analysis
may not apply to compound offenses appeared injustice Rehnquist's
dissent in Wha/en v. United States.20 4 Justice Rehnquist said, "[T]he
Blockburger test, although useful in identifying statutes that define
greater and lesser included offenses in the traditional sense, is less
satisfactory, and perhaps even misdirected, when applied to statutes
20 5
defining 'compound' and 'predicate' offenses."
Justice Rehnquist's view prevailed in Garrett v. United States.20 6
There, the Court adopted the presumption that when Congress cre200
201
202
203
204
205
206

Rutledge v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 1241, 1248-49 (1996).
Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932).
See, e.g., Whaln, 445 U.S. at 684.

Rutledge, 116 S. Ct. at 1245-46.
Whalen, 445 U.S. at 708 (RehnquistJ., dissenting).
k
471 U.S. 773 (1985).
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20 7
ates two distinct offenses it intends to permit cumulative sentences.
0
8
s
This conclusion is antithetical to the Blockburge analysis, which provides that conviction under two statutes violates the Double Jeopardy
20 9
Clause unless Congress explicitly provides otherwise.
The view that Blockburger does not apply to compound offenses
gained further support in United States v. Dixon.210 There, the Court
determined that Blockburger was the correct test for determining
whether two statutes create the "same offense;" however, the Court
2 11
could not agree as to the test's applicability to compound offenses.
Justice Rehnquist again voiced his hesitance in applying Blockburger to
2 12
cases of greater and lesser included offenses.
Unfortunately, the majority in Dixon did not rebut this aspect of
Rehnquist's dissent, thus leaving the disposition of the matter in flux.
Therefore, the debate over whether the Blockburgertest applies to compound offenses still exists, and the Rutledge Court inappropriately disregarded it. It is unlikely that the Court's failure to address this issue
reflects its approval of the position that the Blockburger test does apply
to compound offenses. If the Court did condone this position, it
would have explicitly so stated, as it stated its intention to put an end
to the debate over whether convictions for CCE and conspiracy constitute double jeopardy.
Furthermore, had the Court looked to analysis in recent decisions, including Garrett and Dixon, it would have properly concluded
that the Blockburger test certainly does not apply to every compound
offense.
C.

THE COURT SHOULD HAVE ANALYZED DOUBLE JEOPARDY IN THE
CONTEXT OF RICO

Many courts and scholars have made a sound analogy between
the CCE statute 21 3 and the RICO statute. 2 14 Both CCE and RICO re207 Id. at 793.
208 Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932).
209 I.

210 113 S. Ct. 2849 (1993).
211 Id. Justice Scalia andJustice Rehnquist agreed that Blockurgercontrolled but did not
agree on how to apply Blockburgerto the compound offenses at issue. Id. at 2852; id. at 2865
(Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
212 Id. at 2868.
213 21 U.S.C. § 848 (1996).
214 21 U.S.C. § 1962 (1994); see, e.g., United States v. Pungitore, 910 F.2d 1084, 1107-11
(3d Cir. 1990); 22nd Annual Review of Criminal Procedure: United States Supreme Court and
Courts of Appeals, 1991-1992, 81 GEO. L.J. 853, 1240-44 (1993); Susan W. Brenner, Of Complicity and Enterprise Criminality:Applying Pinkerton Liability to RICO Actions, 56 Mo. L. RE%,.
931, 990-1005 (1991); Anne Bowen Poulin, DoubleJeopardy ProtectionAgainst Successive Prosecutions in Complex Criminal Cases:A Mode 25 CONN. L. REv. 95, 132 (1992).
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quire predicate offenses, and Congress enacted both to combat organized crime. Thus, although RICO cases are not controlling in the
CCE context, the courts' reasoning in such cases is applicable. In
coming to its decision in Rutledge, the Court improperly disregarded
this analogy.
Courts have found that punishing RICO enterprise and conspiracy offenses cumulatively does not violate the Double Jeopardy
Clause. 2 15 For example, in United States v. Pungitore the Third Circuit
addressed the issue of whether conviction and sentencing for RICO
and conspiracy violate the Double Jeopardy Clause. 2 16 The Pungitore
court stated that Garrettapplied to allow cumulative punishments for
RICO and its predicate offense of conspiracy.2 17 The court cited an
earlier Third Circuit case 2 18 that applied Garrettto RICO and one of
its substantive predicate offenses.2 1 9 The Pungitore court could not
find any "principled way to distinguish [conspiracy] from [the earlier
predicate offense]." 220 According to the court, legislative history indicating that Congress intended cumulative punishment for RICO and
its substantive predicate offenses applied equally to RICO and
221
conspiracy.
Due to the similarities in the RICO and CCE statutes, the
Supreme Court should have looked to the RICO context in deciding
Rutledge. Like the Pungitorecourt, it should have applied Garrett'sanalysis of CCE and its underlying offenses rather than the analysis in Jeffers. In doing so, it would have come to the conclusion that Congress
intended to create multiple punishment for CCE and each of its predicate offenses, including conspiracy, and therefore that sentences for
CCE and conspiracy do not constitute Double Jeopardy.
D.

THE COURT'S CONSERVATIVE IDEALS REGARDING ITS ROLE EXPLAIN
THE COURT'S DECISION IN RUTLEDGE

Due to the Court's unwillingness to abandon its conservative ideals, it inappropriately disregarded precedent and thus arrived at an
improper decision. The Court's decision in Rutledge v. United States,
while seemingly antithetical to much of its recent double jeopardyju215 See, e.g., Pungitore,910 F.2d at 1107-11; United States v. West, 877 F.2d 281, 292 (4th
Cir. 1989); United States v. Watchmaker, 761 F.2d 1459, 1477 (11th Cir. 1985); cf. United
States v. Sutton, 642 F.2d 1001, 1040 (6th Cir. 1980) (en banc) (where evidence of RICO

conspiracy and violation is identical, the two charges must merge for sentencing).
216 Pungitore, 910 F.2d at 1107-11.
217 Id.

218 United States v. Grayson, 795 F.2d 278, 286 (3d Cir. 1986).
219 Pugnitore,910 F.2d at 1108.
220 Id. at 1108 n.24.
221 Id. at 1108.
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risprudence, may reflect the modem Court's commitment tojudicial
restraint.22 2 One scholar described several criminal law decisions as
indicative of the Court's desire to apply the Constitution and federal
statutes as written, rather than creating new law.223

In particular,

Chief Justice Rehnquist "has shown a willingness to rule in favor of
criminal defendants when their arguments are supported by the plain
meaning or clear history of a particular law."2

4

Put another way, the

Court has demonstrated a marked reluctance to look to legislative history where the statute itself could provide an acceptable answer.
For instance, in Robinson v. United States,22 5 the Court unanimously struck down a five-year sentence enhancement to a 157-month
cocaine possession sentence.2 2 6 The Court based its decision upon
the plain language of a federal enhancement statute, 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(c) (1) (1988).227 The Court emphasized its belief that the
Court's job is to interpret and apply law, while it is up to Congress to
228
write the law.

In another case, Lonchar v. Thomas,22 9 the Court ruled without
dissent in favor of a criminal defendant. 23 0 There, Georgia asked the
Court to exclude a habeas petition based upon the defendant's alleged "bad faith delay" in filing the petition.2 3' The Court rejected
this request based upon the plain language of the applicable federal
rule, which placed no restrictions or deadlines on the filing of first
habeas petitions.23 2 Although these decisions may indicate the
Court's willingness to protect criminal defendants, perhaps they can
better be described as favoring the letter of law.2 33
222 See L. Anita Richardson, Translating the Letter of Law: Court's Focus on Interpretation
Brings SurprisingResults in Criminal Cases, 82 A.B.A.J. 50 (1996); see also Richard E. Levy &
Robert L. GlicksmanJudicial Activism and Restraint in the Supreme Court's EnvironmentalLaw
Decisions, 42 VAND. L REv. 343, 346 (1989) (analyzing Supreme Court's emphasis on judicial restraint in its environmental decisions); G. Richard Shell, Contracts in the Modern
Supreme Court, 81 CALIF. L Rav. 433, 528 (1993) (stating that Court applies fundamental
value ofjudicial restraint in reviewing economic regulation).
223 Richardson, supranote 222, at 50. But see Michael S. Gershowitz, Note, Waiver of the
Plea-Statement Rules, 86J. GRIM. L & CRIMINOLOGY 1439 (1996) (discussing United States v.
Mezzanatto, 115 S. Ct. 797 (1995), where the majority failed to follow the plain meaning of
the statute at issue, but the dissent by Justice Souter relied heavily upon that plain

meaning).
224 Richardson, supra note 222, at 50.
225 116 S.Ct. 501 (1995).
226 Id. at 509.
227 Id. at 506.
228 Id. at 506-9.
229 116 S. Ct. 1293 (1996).
230 &

231 Id.
232 Id
233 See Richardson, supra note 222.
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Awareness of this trend of unanimous and near-unanimous decisions makes Rutledge less surprising, and it provides at least a partial
explanation for what motivated the Rutledge Court. For instance,
neither the plain language of the statute nor the legislative history
explicitly provide multiple punishments in Rutledge. Rather than looking to legislative history for evidence of intent, the Court based its
opinion on the plain language, or absence of plain language in the
statute. This desire to apply the letter of the law may also explain the
Rutledge Court's reluctance to apply Garrett,as the analysis there rested
primarily on an examination of legislative history rather than on plain
language.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The Court's decision in Rutledge v. United States does not comport
with the trend the Court had been following in the context of continuing criminal enterprise and double jeopardy jurisprudence. If the
Court had looked at the analysis of plain language and legislative history as described in Garrettv. United States, the possible inapplicability
of the Blockburgertest in determining whether two statutes impermissibly punish a criminal defendant for the "same offense," and decisions
in the analogous context of RICO and racketeering conspiracy, it
would have come to an opposite and better reasoned conclusion. The
positive aspect of this decision is that it finally put an end to the ongoing confusion over whether convictions and sentences for continuing
criminal enterprise and narcotics conspiracy violate double jeopardy.
Unfortunately, the grounds upon which the Court based its decision
raise questions as to the soundness and finality of the Court's reasoning and stare decisis.
AMYJ. KAPPELER

